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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops and deploys a theoretical framework for assessing the prospects of a cluster 
of technologies driving what is often called the digital transformation. There is considerable uncertainty 
regarding this transformation’s future trajectory, and to understand and bound that uncertainty, we build 
on Schumpeter’s macro-level theory of economy-wide, technological revolutions and on the work of 
several scholars who have extended that theory. In this perspective, such revolutions’ trajectories are 
shaped primarily by the interaction of changes within and between three spheres—technology, 
organization, and public policy. We enrich this account by identifying the critical problems and the 
collective choices among competing solutions to those problems that together shape the trajectory of each 
revolution. We argue that the digital transformation represents a new phase in the wider arc of the 
Information and Computer Technology revolution—a phase promising much wider deployment—and that 
the trajectory of this deployment depends on collective choices to be made in the organizational and 
public-policy spheres. Combining in a two-by-two matrix the two main alternative solutions on offer in 
each of these two spheres, we identify four scenarios for the future trajectory of the digital transformation: 
digital authoritarianism, digital oligarchy, digital localism, and digital democracy. We discuss how these 
scenarios can help us trace and understand the future trajectory of the digital transformation. 
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Digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, big data analytics, 
robotics, digital platforms, social media, blockchain, and 3-D printing have the potential to transform vast 
swaths of human activity. The term “digital transformation” is often used to capture the commonalities 
and interdependencies within this cluster of emerging technologies as well as the scope and magnitude of 
the revolutionary changes they portend in industry and society (Lanzolla et al. 2020; Nambisan et al. 
2019; Vial 2019). But uncertainty about its future trajectory abounds. Both practitioner and scholarly 
literatures offer extrapolations from the current situation, forecasts that are sometimes pessimistic (e.g., 
“surveillance capitalism” as delineated by Zuboff (2019)) and sometimes optimistic (e.g., commons-based 
peer production as delineated by Benkler (2006)). This paper aims to bound the uncertainty about the 
direction that the digital transformation will take, and to identify the collective choices we face in shaping 
that direction. To do this, we advance a conceptual framework that locates the factors that will shape this 
trajectory, and we use this framework to identify several plausible alternative scenarios for it. 
The digital transformation is not simply a basket of individual innovations: it is an interdependent 
cluster of revolutionary technologies, where developments in each technology affect many others. 
Moreover, the trajectory of such an epochal transformation is shaped by organizational and societal 
contexts, and those contexts evolve in interaction with each other and with technological changes. To 
understand such a phenomenon, we need to shift attention from the “micro” level of individual innovators 
and innovations (e.g., Scott and Bruce 1994) and from the “meso” level of individual technologies and 
industries (e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990), to the “macro” level of technological revolutions as 
epochal, societal-scale phenomena. 
A natural starting point for such a discussion is Schumpeter’s classic works (Schumpeter 1934, 
1939, 1942). While Schumpeter’s ideas are often deployed in management and organization studies to 
explain the behavior of individual firms and industries (Ahuja et al. 2008; Nelson and Winter 1982), his 
macro-level theory of economy-wide technological revolutions is only rarely invoked in our field, perhaps 
reflecting something of a “theoretical vacuum” in organization studies at that macro level (Stern and 
Barley 1996) (exceptions include Barley and Kunda 1992; Chandler and Hikino 1990; Dosi and Marengo 
2007; Lewin et al. 1999; Nelson 1995; Vaaler and McNamara 2010). Since Schumpeter’s initial 
statements, scholarship has advanced, and we offer here an account based on the work of a school of neo-
Schumpeterians who have plumbed the history of such revolutions (most notably Freeman and Louça 
2001; Mazzucato 2015; Perez 2003, 2010). 
This macro-oriented strand of Schumpeter-inspired scholarship (we will call it “macro-
Schumpeterian” for short) has identified five economy-wide technological revolutions over the past two 
centuries: the original “industrial revolution” based on machinery and water power, followed by the 
steam-power-and-railway revolution, then by the steel-and-electricity, automobile-and-oil, and most 
recently the computers-and-data revolution, aka the Information and Computer Technology (ICT) 
revolution. Viewed in this context, the digital transformation appears as the latest phase of the wider arc 
of the ICT revolution. Relying on “reasoned history”—historical accounts that are based on qualitative, 
historical-comparative methods rather than on formal quantitative, cliometric models (Freeman and Louça 
2001, Part 1; Schumpeter 1927, p. 288, 298)—these macro-Schumpeterians have discovered some 
striking regularities in the phases and dynamics of those technological revolutions. We build on these 
findings to argue that the future trajectory of the digital transformation will reflect changes in three main 
spheres—technology, organization, and public policy—and in their interaction. While management 
scholarship has devoted considerable attention to the interaction of technology and organization, the study 
of such revolutions demands that we pay equal attention to the public policy sphere.  
If, on the one hand, these retrospective regularities provide precious clues, on the other hand, 
such regularities should not obscure the contingency of history—the choices that might have led to other 
outcomes. Indeed, if our scholarship is to inform practice, it is critical that we understand the scope of the 
collective choices we face today in shaping the future of the digital transformation. Our framework 
therefore aims to deepen macro-Schumpeterian theory by incorporating that indeterminacy. To do this, 
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we look back across prior revolutions to identify the types of problems in each sphere that held back the 
further development of the technological revolution—we call them “critical problems”—and the main 
competing solutions on offer. 
Turning to the future of the digital transformation, we use this macro-Schumpeterian framework 
to guide us to three propositions. First, in the technology sphere, the critical problems appear to have been 
largely overcome. Many of the technologies associated with the digital transformation hold the promise of 
allowing, at last, the deployment of the ICT revolution to a much wider range of applications across 
industry and everyday life. This deployment will be shaped by the choices that will be made about how to 
respond to the critical problems in the organization and public policy spheres. Second, in the organization 
sphere, the critical problem today lies in the limitations of the currently dominant management model, 
which we call “Business Process.” Deployment will be influenced by whether the choice is made to refine 
further that model to offer even more control and exploitation benefits or to supersede it with a model—
we call it “Community-and-Collaboration”—that better supports the empowerment of communities and 
bottom-up collaboration across intra- and inter-firm networks. Third, the choice of management models 
will itself depend in considerable measure on choices about public policy. The critical problem here lies 
in the limitations of the current “laissez-faire” public policy regime—aka “neoliberalism” (Harvey 2007a; 
Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005)—which has been dominant in the United States for the past four decades; 
deployment will be shaped by whether the collective choice is to move further in the direction of laissez-
faire or to adopt a regime based on a more proactive, system-building role for government in the 
economy. 
Putting together the main options for solving the critical problems in the organizational and 
public policy sphere points to four alternative futures for the digital transformation. If a laissez-faire 
policy regime is combined with an exploitive Business Process model, we foresee a scenario evolving 
toward a corporate-dominated digital oligarchy. If a system-building public policy regime is combined 
with that Business Process model, we foresee a scenario toward a government-elite-dominated digital 
authoritarianism. If a laissez-faire policy regime is combined in some local jurisdictions with a 
Community-and-Collaboration model and in other jurisdictions with a reinforced Business Process model, 
we foresee a patchwork pattern of digital localism. If a system-building policy regime is combined with 
wide diffusion of this new Community-and-Collaboration model, we foresee a scenario of digital 
democracy. Given the United States’ leading role in the ICT revolution so far, our primary focus is on the 
prospects for the digital transformation in the United States, but we will also call out key factors that 
might shape differences across countries, orienting them to different scenarios. 
With this argument, our paper makes three main contributions. First, aiming to theorize 
technological revolutions at the societal level, we mobilize macro-Schumpeterian theory and expand the 
two-way interaction of technology and organization to a three-way interaction of technology, 
organization, and public policy: we identify the dominant models in each of the three spheres, and we 
show how their interplay shapes the trajectories of macro-level technological revolutions. Second, we 
augment macro-Schumpeterian theory by developing a framework that accommodates the contingency of 
history: by identifying the critical problems and the competing alternative solutions, we can clarify the 
collective choices ahead of us in the digital transformation. Third, we offer a theoretically and historically 
informed framework that enables us to go beyond the discussion of either optimistic or pessimistic digital 
futures and outline a richer, more realistic set of alternative futures for the digital transformation. 
In the sections below, we first introduce the proposed macro-Schumpeterian framework and the 
three-way interaction of technology, organization, and public policy, and explain the role of critical 
problems and alternative solutions. We then discuss the development of the digital transformation in each 
of the three spheres, their respective critical problems, and competing solutions. This leads to our 
discussion of the four scenarios. We conclude by identifying some directions for future research. 
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 A MACRO-SCHUMPETERIAN FRAMEWORK 
Schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1942) saw technological revolutions as critical to understanding 
capitalism’s characteristically uneven pattern of “creative destruction.” He argued that capitalist 
development is shaped by technological competition between firms, encompassing innovation in 
products, processes, raw materials, and ways to organize business. A successful innovator will attract a 
swarm of imitators. Moreover, there may be knock-on effects as some innovations induce other, 
complementary innovations. Such systemic interdependencies among technologies explain why 
innovations often occur in clusters. The largest of these clusters form technological revolutions that affect 
not only individual industries but the entire structure of industry and fabric of society. 
The macro-Schumpeterians identify five technological revolutions in the history of capitalism—
rather than lumping the first four into one big “Industrial Revolution,” as do, for example, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014). Their reasoned history of these various revolutions (primarily: Freeman and Louça 
2001; Perez 2003, 2010) has yielded some striking generalizations—“stylized facts” as discussed by 
Helfat (2007)—about the way they unfold.1 
First, revolutions take shape initially in one or two “leading countries”—Britain in the Industrial 
Revolution and the steam-power-and-railways revolution, the United States and Germany in the steel-
and-electricity revolution, and the United States in the automobile-and-oil and ICT revolutions. The 
revolutions then diffuse to other countries, mutating along the way as they encounter diverse 
organizational and societal contexts. 
Second, comparing the four prior revolutions in their leading countries, we find a common phase 
pattern: we summarize it here and discuss the underlying dynamics in the paragraphs below. The 
technologies that eventually cohere as the core of a technological revolution emerge during an incubation 
period, whose duration seems to have been rather variable across revolutions. At some point, the most 
successful of these new technologies draw the attention of investors and the installation period begins 
with the rapid expansion of new “leading industries,” and with the development of complementary 
product, process, and infrastructure innovations. But beyond those new industries, the rest of the economy 
benefits much less from the new technologies, because the organizational forms and public policies 
inherited from the prior revolution are ill-suited to the new technologies. Moreover, the tension between 
the frenzy of investment in the new industries and the limited deployment across the rest of the economy 
generates a period of financial, economic, and social crisis. The urgency of the crisis and the widely 
shared eagerness to ensure wide deployment of the new technologies across the economy together 
stimulate further innovations in organization forms and public policies. Finally, the revolution enters a 
period of exhaustion: here the developmental potential of the new technologies is largely fulfilled, and 
this exhaustion encourages technological innovation efforts in new directions.  
Third, the cumulative effect of technological, organizational, and public policy innovations in 
each revolution yields a new paradigm in each of the three spheres—paradigms that are in turn made 
obsolete by the subsequent revolution. By analogy with Kuhn’s (1970) concept of scientific paradigm, we 
use the term to refer to a constellation of interrelated concepts that are institutionalized in practices and 
that together set an agenda for future refinement. In the technological sphere, paradigms emerge in the 
form of a new “technological system” (Perez 2010). Technological revolutions also stimulate paradigm 
changes in the organizational and public policy spheres, and the pattern of change is distinctive within 
each sphere. 
From a macro-Schumpeterian perspective, the dynamics that shape each technological revolution 
are a function of the evolution within the technology, organization, and public policy spheres and 
interactions between them. Each sphere in each technological revolution is characterized by a revolution-
 
1 On the nature and importance of stylized facts in scholarship, see Helfat (2007, p. 187), who 
characterizes stylized facts as “observations that have been made in so many contexts that they are widely 
understood to be empirical truths, to which theories must fit.” 
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specific paradigm, which emerges as the cumulative result of successive problem-solving cycles. In the 
following paragraphs, we identify the main problem-solving cycles and the main solutions—different 
types of dominant models—yielded by these cycles in each of the three spheres. We focus on the patterns 
found in earlier revolutions, and leave to the subsequent section our discussion of how this history helps 
us make sense of the ICT revolution and the digital transformation. 
The technology sphere 
In the macro-Schumpeterian account, technological innovations often cluster into waves—
“revolutions”—that yield new technological paradigms. Innovations lead to revolutions if “bandwagons” 
of several different innovations “roll” together (Freeman 1982, p. 67). This is particularly likely in the 
presence of a general-purpose technology (GPT) (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995) and the resulting 
complementarities and synergies among associated technologies (Rosenberg 1979). 
Generalizing across prior revolutions, the pattern here appears to be that each new technological 
paradigm emerges through two types of problem-solving cycles. A first type is aimed at consolidating the 
new GPT itself—yielding a set of foundational innovations, and establishing enough evidence of the 
GPT’s potential to attract innovators aiming to exploit it. A second type is aimed at expanding and 
cheapening a set of applications and complementary products. 
Freeman and Louça (2001) summarize the foundation of these generalizations in their analysis of 
prior technological revolutions. The original “industrial revolution” (approximately 1750s–1840s) started 
in Britain. It was based on water power as a GPT, on cotton, iron, and water as core inputs, and on 
weaving and water-power machinery. The emerging water-power-and-cotton paradigm was augmented 
by new supporting infrastructure (canals and roads), by new complementary technologies (e.g., iron 
components of water wheels and weaving machinery), by new production processes (water-powered 
industrial production of cotton products), and eventually by new, unanticipated applications (e.g., iron 
cutlery and cooking tools). 
The second technological revolution (approximately 1790s–1890s) also began in Britain, but the 
United States was not far behind. It was based on steam power as a GPT, on coal and iron as core inputs, 
and on the railway. The emerging steam-power-and-railways paradigm was augmented by new 
supporting infrastructure (railway and telegraph networks), by new complementary technologies (e.g., the 
telegraph); by new production processes (e.g., steam-powered industrial production of machine tools that 
were independent of waterways) and eventually by new, unanticipated applications (e.g., steamships). 
The third revolution (approximately 1850s–1940s) saw the United States take the role of leading 
country. This revolution was based on electricity as a GPT, on iron as a core input, and on steel 
applications. The emerging steel-and-electricity paradigm was augmented by new supporting 
infrastructure (intercontinental trade enabled by robust steel ships), by new complementary technologies 
(e.g., heavy engineering), by new production processes (more flexible production processes that were 
independent of bulky steam engines and based on deploying the electric motor) and eventually by new, 
unanticipated applications (e.g., the telephone). 
The fourth revolution (approximately 1880s–1980s) was based on the internal combustion engine 
as a GPT, on oil as core input, and on the automobile. The emerging automobile-and-oil paradigm was 
augmented by new supporting infrastructure (e.g., highways and airports), new complementary 
technologies (e.g., plastics), new production processes (assembly-line-based mass production) and 
eventually by new, unanticipated applications (e.g., myriad new household applications). 
These partly overlapping technological revolutions also yielded new leading industries and 
exemplary firms. Giant oligopolistic firms emerged in the installation phase of each successive 
revolutions: Erie Railroad and Pennsylvania Railroad; Bethlehem and United States Steel; the “big three” 
auto companies, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler (Bodrožić and Adler 2018). The dominance of these 
firms was not only based on their technological prowess but also on changes in the organizational and 
public policy spheres. 
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The organizational sphere 
Inventions are consequential when they are taken up by enterprises as innovations—when 
enterprises invest in them, refine them, and bring the associated products to market and new processes to 
scale. That distinction between invention and innovation was one of Schumpeter’s core insights. Macro-
Schumpeterian research on prior revolutions shows that this innovation process necessitates 
organizational changes. The radically new technologies fit uneasily within the inherited organizational 
paradigm, and each technological revolution has thus led to a new organizational paradigm. The historical 
record suggests that each new paradigm emerged in two problem-solving cycles, with each cycle yielding 
a new dominant “management model”—a new body of ideas that offer management guidance on how to 
deal with their technical and social tasks (Bodrožić and Adler 2018). 
In a primary cycle, a “paradigm-revolutionizing” model emerges in response to the perceived 
inadequacy of the then-prevailing organizational paradigm in the face of the new technologies’ potential. 
This primary cycle yields a new management model that obsoletes the inherited paradigm and restores 
“external fit” between key organizational elements and the new technologies’ potential. It solves some of 
the misfit between the technology and organizational sphere, but simultaneously generates dysfunctional 
misfit among organizational elements. Its limitations spark a secondary problem-solving cycle, which 
yields a new, “paradigm-balancing” management model, which aims to reestablish “internal fit” among 
organizational elements (Miller 1992) so as to harness the bottom-up innovation capacity of people and 
organizations. This new, balancing model helps to stabilize the revolution’s organizational paradigm. 
Viewed through the lenses of Schumpeter’s (1942) theory of creative destruction—and the 
critical role of the destructive moment—it is not hard to see why the primary cycles typically led to 
unbalanced models that left in their wake considerable labor strife, and that thus triggered secondary, 
balancing cycles. The dialectical tension between paradigm-revolutionizing and paradigm-balancing 
models was captured in organization theory in the contrast between rational, technical models and 
normative, commitment-oriented ones drawn by Barley and Kunda (1992). Market and Hierarchy were 
the dominant organizing principles in the former, and Community was more salient in the latter (Adler 
2001). 
We can illustrate by pointing to the two cycles in some of the prior revolutions (as reviewed by 
Bodrožić and Adler 2018). In the steel-and-electricity revolution, the radical technological innovations 
associated with steel production and electric power afforded higher throughput speed and greater 
efficiency in factory layout. This challenged managers and engineers to rethink workstation design and 
workflow plans. The prevailing organizational paradigm inherited from the steam-power-and-railways 
revolution did not offer answers: Frederick Taylor’s organizational innovations, developed and 
implemented in leading steel firms such as Bethlehem Steel, emerged in response. Scientific Management 
integrated these organizational innovations into a coherent, new management model characterized by 
time-and-motion studies, new principles in plant layout, and more rational and equitable incentive 
payments. 
However, in the form in which it was most frequently implemented, Scientific Management also 
generated dysfunctions, such as highly regimented work and weakly motivated factory workers. These 
dysfunctions in turn triggered a secondary cycle of organizational innovations focused on restoring 
greater internal fit. This cycle coalesced around the Human Relations model, which aimed to create 
greater harmony in workplaces by encouraging individualized personal consideration in supervisor-
employee relations. It was the synthesis of the Scientific Management and Human Relations models that 
defined the dominant organizational paradigm (which we call the “Factory” paradigm) in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. 
The next revolution, the automobile-and-oil revolution, brought a proliferation of cheap, mass-
produced consumer goods, challenging firms to respond to the different “purse and purpose” of different 
consumers. The Factory paradigm did not offer answers to this problem, and in response, organizational 
innovators in the automobile industry (most notably Alfred Sloan in General Motors) created the 
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“Strategy-and-Structure” model, which was subsequently diffused across the corporate landscape: semi-
autonomous business units were assigned the responsibility for offering mass-produced goods and 
services to differentiated market segments. The dysfunctions of that Strategy-and-Structure model, such 
as poor quality and low worker involvement, were subsequently addressed by the emergence of a 
paradigm-balancing model—“Quality Management.” The synthesis of the Strategy-and-Structure and 
Quality Management models defined the organizational paradigm (which we call the “Corporation” 
paradigm) of the second half of the twentieth century. 
We should note that causality runs both ways between technology and organization spheres. 
Technological innovation (e.g., widely available electrical power) triggered organizational innovation 
(e.g., factory reorganization based on Scientific Management), which in turn triggered technological 
innovation (e.g., the development of new variants of electric motors and electric-powered machinery that 
offered more flexibility in factory layout). The interplay of technology and organization spheres alone, 
however, does not explain why leading steel and automobile firms turned into powerful oligopolies. 
Public policy sphere 
Macro-Schumpeterian research on the history of prior revolutions suggests that the two-way 
interaction of technology and organization has both shaped and been shaped by their interaction with a 
third sphere—public policy. In this sphere too, each revolution saw two successive problem-solving 
cycles, which each generated a distinct model of public policy—a public policy “regime.” (We adopt the 
definition of policy regimes offered by May and Jochim (2013, p. 428) as “the governing arrangements 
for addressing policy problems.”) 
In the installation phase of each of the prior technological revolutions, growing concern with the 
misfit between the new technologies and the inherited public policy regime typically led to a shift in 
public policies toward laissez-faire, taking a somewhat different coloration in each revolution. In practice, 
this has meant not so much a retreat of the state as breaking down restrictions on the business sector that 
were inherited from the prior public policy regime (such as labor laws, banking regulations, etc.) and that 
might stand in the way of the enthusiastic flow of investment into the new core industries. The primary 
goal was to unleash the energy associated with the potential for private-value creation. A laissez-faire 
policy regime lifted roadblocks to investments in the new cluster of technologies, but it also allowed the 
emergence of giant oligopolies in key industries (in successive revolutions: railways; steel and electricity; 
automobile and oil), growing inequality, and the erosion of market-stabilizing regulations. The latter 
fueled an investment frenzy (successively: the canal mania, the railway mania, the Gilded Age, the 
Roaring Twenties), and these frenzies have all culminated in society-wide financial, economic, and 
institutional crises (successively: the Panic of 1847 in Britain and the 1870s depression in United States, 
followed in the United States by the 1890s depression, and then by the 1930s Great Depression). 
In the course of each of the prior revolutions, these crises led to a reorientation of public policy 
toward a system-building role for government—both to absorb the crisis and to assure the wider 
deployment of the new technologies beyond the leading industries. Indeed, the macro-Schumpeterians 
have shown that while the installation phase was often assisted by public policies aimed at increasing the 
rate of private-sector innovation, the deployment phase has typically been associated with public policies 
that also aimed to shape the overall direction of innovation (Mazzucato 2015). The authoritative power of 
government created a shared sense of the likely course of economic development, which in turn 
strengthened investor confidence. The system-building regimes—again, with a somewhat different 
coloration in each revolution—established critical material and social infrastructure, and also shared more 
equally the fruits of the technological revolution. 
Adopting again Schumpeter’s (1942, p. 70) creative-destruction lenses, we can see why a laissez-
faire public policy regime typically dominates initially, but why it also leads to a crisis, triggering a 
system-building regime in its wake. The dialectical tension between these two policy regimes was 
articulated by political scientists such as Hirschman (2002) as a contrast between private versus public 
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interests, and by political-economists such as Polanyi ([1944] 1968) as a contrast between a dis-embedded 
economy versus one that is re-embedded. 
To illustrate the contrast, consider the steel-and-electricity revolution. Its installation period 
started in the 1870s and gave rise to a massive wave of investment in machine-based manufacturing and 
agriculture, to the huge increase in inequality known as the Gilded Age, to the emergence of oligopolies 
such as US Steel (their CEOs attacked as “robber baron” by their critics), and eventually to the Panic of 
1893 and the deep depression of 1893–1897. The subsequent shift from installation to deployment during 
the Progressive era was marked not only by government support for the creation of the country’s 
comprehensive “network of power” (Hughes 1993), but also by a broad campaign to eliminate 
government corruption, by the first serious enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (which was 
strongly opposed by advocates of laissez-faire policies but supported by social movements), by the 
introduction of women’s suffrage, by the creation of the Federal Reserve, and by a range of system-
building rural reforms (Freeman and Louça 2001). 
And consider the automobile-and-oil revolution, whose installation period ran from 
approximately 1910 to 1930 (Freeman and Louça 2001). The opportunities represented by the new 
technology prompted a wave of investment and accelerated productivity growth, and thereby contributed 
to the dynamism of the Roaring Twenties. Public policy moved in a laissez-faire direction. As President 
Coolidge famously stated in 1923: “the business of America is business” (Wilson 2016, p. 24). Weak 
regulation encouraged a frenzy of speculative stock market investment and a rapid expansion of consumer 
credit for the new commodities (cars, appliances, etc.). Oligopolies (most notably, the Big Three in the 
auto industry) grew in power. Inequality soared. Agricultural employment collapsed as productivity 
growth accelerated, leading to social crisis in rural areas. Public policy did little to boost consumer 
purchasing power, and investment and production rapidly outstripped demand. The combination of these 
factors (among others) led to the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. 
In response to this crisis, a new public policy model emerged in the New Deal. New regulations 
were introduced to stabilize the banks and financial markets. Government encouraged the expansion of 
investment in the real economy and supported home mortgage loans. Legislation formalized the role of 
unions, and these unions negotiated wage increases in line with productivity increases, thereby ensuring 
growing demand for the output of a technologically dynamic manufacturing sector. This system-building 
regime also responded to the opportunities created by the automobile-and-oil revolution with massive 
public investment in highways, creating the transport infrastructure on which we still rely (Gordon 2000). 
The robustness of this framework 
The present paper aims to build on and expand this macro-Schumpeterian foundation to 
understand the digital transformation. But before proceeding, we should address some potential 
limitations and explain why they should not deter us. 
First, some doubt that innovations cluster so strongly (e.g., Puffert 2003). Many historians of 
technology recoil at the idea that we can reduce the historical record of the manifold technologies to a 
series of neatly discrete technological revolutions. Historians of management and public policy might 
have a similar reaction. We see this as a matter of the difference in taste between lumpers and splitters. 
Second, there is debate about the connection between these technological revolutions and the 
“Kondratieff” cycles of GDP growth and contraction of about fifty to sixty years in duration (Kondratieff 
1979 [1926]). While Schumpeter argued that technological revolutions explained these long waves 
(Mager 1987), some macro-Schumpeterians see only a looser connection (Perez 2003, 2010). This is an 
interesting question, but does not have much impact on the questions addressed in the present paper. 
Third, our focus on these three spheres means leaving aside a range of other contextual factors 
that surely play a role. Culture, for instance, has had a significant impact on the trajectory of technological 
revolutions (see for example Perez and Leach (2018) discussion of the importance of lifestyle changes). 
We make this simplification to avoid escalating theoretical complexity; but the framework can be 
expanded in the future. 
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Fourth, we abstract from major, relatively unpredictable events like wars, volcanic eruptions, and 
pandemics, which can affect a technological revolution’s trajectory (as noted by Kaldor 2021; Schot and 
Kanger 2018). Both of the twentieth century’s world wars, for example, had important effects (Jaworski 
and Fishback 2018). On the other hand, a focus on public policy has the advantage of bringing into focus 
the means by which we might collectively influence the trajectory of the revolution currently underway. 
And finally, while macro-level macro-Schumpeterian historical research has revealed a strong 
pattern across prior revolutions, it has been less helpful in identifying the uncertainties and options facing 
actors as they made the various choices that gave rise to that pattern. Here is where we propose to 
augment the macro-Schumpeterian framework, as explained below. 
From ex post regularities to ex ante choices 
Our review of prior revolutions revealed some important regularities across them. In reality, 
however, each of the prior technological revolutions encountered “forks in the road” where different 
choices could have led to different outcomes. A rigorous account of technological revolutions—especially 
one that aims to inform the collective choices ahead of us with the digital transformation—must therefore 
dive deeper and characterize these forks in the road. 
We saw that in each of the prior revolutions there were two main types of problem-solving cycles 
in each of the three spheres. In each cycle, a critical problem came into focus as the impediment to the 
progress of the revolution—visible in significant system-level performance limitations and disappointing 
rates of system performance improvement (e.g. David 1990; David and Wright 1999).2 There was 
considerable uncertainty about how to overcome such paradigm-constituting problems. Innovators 
entered uncharted territory here, and different actors advocated competing, alternative options. Our 
account brought to the fore the repeated sequence (across revolutions) in the types of solutions retained: 
but we need to unpack this observed ex post pattern, to reveal the underlying ex ante choices and the 
options not retained. We review the three spheres in turn to offer some illustrations. 
In the technology sphere, in the narrative offered above, each revolution encountered critical 
problems that cluster in two broad types: one related to consolidating the core GPT, and another, more 
heterogeneous cluster related to the dearth of creative applications that would drive wider deployment 
beyond the core industries. We can illustrate the critical problems and alternative solutions for both types 
with examples from the fourth technological revolution (the automobile-and-oil revolution). For the first 
type: before the internal combustion engine became recognized as the GPT, some vehicles were powered 
by steam or electric engines. The internal combustion engine only became dominant after a series of 
technological innovations led to its higher efficiency relative to those alternatives (Freeman and Louça 
2001). And consider for the second type: many accessories and components for automobiles were initially 
made out of natural materials such as metal, wood, rubber, and leather. With the advent of oil-based 
plastics, cheaper and lighter alternatives emerged, becoming increasingly dominant in the course of the 
twentieth century, even if some product lines continued to rely on the natural materials to signal their 
luxury status (Freeman and Louça 2001). (The twenty-first century might witness a reversal of the 
twentieth century's choices: the re-emergence of the electric motor and of materials that are not synthetic 
and are easier to recycle). 
Turning to the organizational sphere, the historical pattern of retained solutions that we described 
above was that in each revolution, a first problem-solving cycle led to the emergence of a paradigm-
revolutionizing model, which was dominant in the earlier phases of the revolution, and a second cycle led 
 
2 Theoretically, we can connect the notion of a critical, paradigm-constituting problem to the concept of 
reverse salient: “A salient is a protrusion in a geometric figure, a line of battle, or an expanding weather 
front. As technological systems expand, reverse salients develop. Reverse salients are components in the 
system that have fallen behind or are out of phase with the others” (Hughes 1987, pp. 66-67). We build on 
Hughes’s observation that reverse salients have often emerged outside the technology sphere—in the 
constraints of prevailing organizational forms or limited access to finance, for example. 
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to a paradigm-balancing model, which was dominant in the later phases. This pattern should not obscure 
the variety of possible resolutions of the critical problems in each of the cycles, and the vigorous debates 
among proponents of alternative models. Consider the third technological revolution (steel-and-
electricity). A coercive form of Scientific Management became the dominant model in the installation 
phase of this revolution; but from its early years, that option was in competition with a more participative 
one proposed by Frank and Lillian Gilbreth and other like-minded organizational innovators (Nyland 
1998). 
And consider the Human Relations model, which emerged in the deployment phase of that 
revolution to rebalance the coercive Scientific Management model and restore greater internal fit. Human 
Relations was just one of the options competing for hegemony in the 1920s and 1930s. In comparison 
with the more vigorous paradigm-balancing options on offer—such as ones based on a vision of 
“industrial democracy” (Jacoby 1985)—it proposed a relatively modest rebalancing, aiming to inject 
more individualized personal consideration into supervisor-employee relations. 
In the public policy sphere, installation periods’ problem-solving cycles led to laissez-faire 
regimes and deployment periods’ cycles led to system-building regimes. But here too, this regularity 
should not obscure the variety of possible resolutions of critical problems in each of the cycles and the 
vigorous debates between proponents of competing regimes. These options were already visible in the 
very early history of the United States, as a conflict between Alexander Hamilton, who urged a system-
building regime, and Thomas Jefferson who advocated a laissez-faire approach (Parenti 2020). 
Consider for example the fourth technological revolution (automobile-and-oil). The public policy 
regime during the installation phase of this revolution (culminating in the Roaring Twenties) was strongly 
laissez-faire oriented, promoting deregulation and privatization. However, even during this period, 
system-building alternatives (e.g., public ownership of infrastructure) had their promoters, and in some 
local jurisdictions (e.g., New York) those solutions were implemented with some success (Wilson 2016). 
Conversely, during the crisis and early deployment phases (1930s and 1940s), a strong system-building 
regime emerged in the form of the New Deal. However, even during World War II there were strong 
voices advocating a return to laissez-faire (Wilson 2016).  
Indeed, in prior technological revolutions, critical problems in each of the three spheres could 
have been resolved in alternative ways. In the organization sphere, these alternatives represent different 
resolutions of the dialectical tension between paradigm-revolutionizing and paradigm-balancing goals, 
while in the public policy sphere the alternatives represent different resolutions of the tension between 
laissez-faire’s push for private-value creation versus system-building’s push for public-value creation. Let 
us now turn to the digital transformation and use this framework to understand its critical problems and 
alternative solutions. 
 THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN MACRO-SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Writing in 2021, we appear to be in an extended period of crisis that began with the dot.com 
crash, continued with the 2008 financial crisis, and continues as yet unresolved. While the COVID-19 
pandemic is an externally induced shock, its fatal consequences for vulnerable groups of the society are 
an indicator of burning issues in public policy. This crisis condition is one of many indicators suggesting 
that we are at the inflection point—the crisis phase—that typically separates installation and deployment 
in a technological revolution (Perez 2010). The following subsections test that idea by assessing the state 
of each of the three spheres and putting that state in historical perspective.  
The technology sphere: ready for deployment 
We argue that the digital transformation is the latest phase in the wider arc of the ICT revolution. 
This ICT revolution is essentially a computers-and-data revolution that conjoins, as did preceding 
revolutions, a new general-purpose technology (here, the computer) and new core inputs (here, digital 
data) to create the germs of a new technological paradigm. This emerging ICT paradigm was augmented 
by new supporting infrastructure (notably, the internet; subsequently, social media), new complementary 
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technologies (e.g., those pertaining to telecommunications) and new computer-controlled production 
processes. New applications such as the smart phone (complemented by myriad “apps”), and a family of 
application-oriented digital technologies (e.g., AI, the Internet of Things, big data analytics, robotics, 
social media, blockchain, and 3-D printing) have further expanded the ICT paradigm. 
A broad consensus has emerged that this family of digital technologies offers exciting prospects 
for very wide deployment. Grounds for this optimism are visible when we examine the longer arc of the 
key ICT technologies—see Table 1. The earlier, installation phase of the ICT revolution faced critical 
problems related to the utilization of the computer as a GPT. One of these problems was the transmission 
of data between computers: the lack of an adequate infrastructure for the core input of the ICT revolution 
impeded the development of the whole cluster of technologies. This critical problem was solved (if not 
optimally: see for example Bellovin et al. 2006) with the development of the internet as an open, semi-
public platform: this innovation profoundly affected the trajectory of the whole ICT cluster, and gradually 
the entire economy. With the emergence of the internet, the diffusion of further innovations accelerated, 
and network effects began transforming entire industries (Kushida and Zysman 2009). 
<Put Table 1 about here> 
The second type of critical problem then emerged in the technology sphere—the need for cost-
effective, user-friendly applications that could appeal to a wider set of industries and activities. The more 
recent innovations associated with the digital transformation promise to solve that critical problem, and 
thereby take the revolution far beyond the core “tech” industries that incubated this revolution (World 
Economic Forum 2020). We note for example: the development of high-powered AI and its use in fields 
such as biology and chemistry (Benaich and Hogarth 2021); the enormous potential of the Internet of 
Things in both industry and households (Ranger 2020); the emergence of blockchain, which opens new 
possibilities for smart contracting and collaboration (Murray et al. in press); and the range of commercial 
and scientific applications for low-cost, high-powered visualization tools (The Economist 2020). 
If, on the one hand, the technologies of the digital transformation seem poised for wide 
deployment, on the other hand it is much less clear what form this deployment will take. In contrast to the 
development of the internet, the development of these emerging technologies is increasingly dominated 
by large private companies such as Google and Facebook (Benaich and Hogarth 2021). While the new 
technologies facilitate globalized commercial, financial, and social interaction and new forms of 
collaboration, participation, and democracy, they also enable control, manipulation, and surveillance. 
Network effects and permissive public policies have enabled the progressive concentration of industry, 
and the resulting behemoths have gathered a vast amount of data about customers—as have governments 
about their citizens—even as the mechanisms of data gathering and use have been kept remarkably 
opaque (Faraj et al. 2018; Zuboff 2019). Battles for control over data and the underlying technologies 
have led to international tensions between the United States and China (e.g., in 2020 regarding the role of 
Huawei in communications infrastructure). 
This discussion of the current state of the technology sphere leads to the first of our three 
summary propositions: The emergence of the family of application-oriented digital technologies 
represents a maturation of the new ICT technological paradigm. It signals that the ICT revolution is 
ready to move from the installation phase to the deployment phase. Our current uncertainty as to the 
future trajectory of this revolution is due not only to our ignorance, but also to the under-determined 
nature of this deployment phase. Deployment will be shaped by choices yet to be made in the 
organizational and public policy spheres. 
The organizational sphere: between Business Process and Community-and-Collaboration 
The ICT revolution is stimulating the emergence of a new organization paradigm—the Network 
paradigm (Benkler 2006; Castells 2011). Viewed from the vantage point of our macro-Schumpeterian 
model, this Network paradigm appears to have been initially triggered by a paradigm-revolutionizing 
Business Process management model. This Business Process model was a response to the first critical 
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problem in the organizational sphere of the ICT revolution—the mismatch of ICT technologies and the 
siloed character of the inherited organizational paradigm. The tall walls between units within the firm and 
between the firm and its upstream and downstream exchange partners were seen as impediments to 
exploiting the new technologies’ potential. This critical problem was frequently identified as the main 
reason for the ICT revolution’s “productivity paradox”—the surprisingly slow productivity gains during 
this period in industry taken as a whole (David and Greenstein 1990; Macdonald et al. 2000; Solow 
1987). 
This situation prompted a problem-solving cycle that yielded the concept of “business process 
reengineering” (Hammer 1990): here, new technologies were used to break the siloes that characterized 
the inherited organizational paradigm. Firms were urged to use the new technologies to rationalize their 
business processes across the value chain, to outsource “non-core” activities and employees, and to bridge 
internal and external boundaries (Ashkenas et al. 2015; Davenport and Short 1990; Hammer 1990). While 
business process reengineering was widely criticized and rapidly dropped as a label, the more general idea 
of a “process orientation” within and between organizations (e.g. Majchrzak and Wang 1996) persisted, 
representing the core of the Business Process model. And it enabled the coordination of global supply 
chains (e.g. Garcia-Dastugue and Lambert 2003; Sturgeon and Lester 2002), contributing to the rise of 
“supply chain management” as an important new management concept (Cooper et al. 1997). 
These organizational innovations prompted and then in turn shaped technological innovation, 
particularly in the form of standardized interfaces and linkages that facilitated the flow of information 
across boundaries both within and between firms. Processes were of course important loci of innovation 
in prior revolutions: here what was novel was the use of ICT to expand the reach and increase the 
granularity of management control and value capture, both within and between firms, by deploying a 
combination of hierarchical authority and market power. 
The Business Process model was accompanied by dysfunctions (paralleling the emergence of 
dysfunctions caused by the primary cycle of prior revolutions). Most critically, process reengineering and 
outsourcing often disrupted the fabric of collective tacit knowledge shared by experienced employees 
both within and across firm boundaries, which in turn limited innovativeness and flexibility (Davenport et 
al. 2003). In the macro-Schumpeterian perspective, the need to address these dysfunctions appears as a 
second critical problem in the organization sphere, one that might potentially trigger the emergence of a 
paradigm-balancing model. 
While we have considerable evidence for the importance of the Business Process model as a 
paradigm-revolutionizing model, the corresponding paradigm-balancing model is still in gestation. 
Nevertheless, the pattern in prior revolutions and the recent trends in management publications are 
sufficiently clear to point us to our second summary proposition: The trajectory of the digital 
transformation will depend on the response to the current critical organizational problem of the ICT 
revolution. More specifically, it will depend on whether the Business Process model is refined further to 
generate greater management control and value-capture benefits, or a new model emerges that better 
supports community-building and collaboration in networks. We call this alternative the Community-and-
Collaboration model. The contrast between the two models is presented in Table 2. 
<Put Table 2 about here> 
The current popularity of a number of management concepts points to the emergence of a 
balancing model based on community and collaboration. The literature on “open innovation” embraces 
the potential of collaboration among firms to generate innovation (Chesbrough 2006; Gassmann 2006). 
Research on crowdsourcing (Majchrzak and Malhotra 2020) shows how “collaborative crowdsourcing” 
enriches Business-Process-oriented types of “idea searching.” The emphasis on (re-)creating the fabric of 
collaboration is central in some (but not all) online communities (Faraj et al. 2011), coworking spaces 
(Garrett et al. 2017; Spinuzzi et al. 2019), ecosystems (Dattée et al. 2018), and crowdfunding platforms 
(Belleflamme et al. 2014; Leung and Sharkey 2014). The goal of cultivating collaboration among 
community members underlies management concepts like scrum, agile, and DevOps in software 
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development (Conboy 2009; Schwaber and Beedle 2002).3 Within firms, Community-and-Collaboration 
approaches appear in a range of forms, from producer cooperatives to advanced forms of participative 
management in conventional capitalist firms. Between firms, it can take the form of “managed ecologies” 
(Altman et al. 2021) and the “collaborative communities” discussed by Snow et al. (2009). 
The contours of this Community-and-Collaboration model are still somewhat undefined, but 
appear to fit the general characteristics of paradigm-balancing models in aiming to harness bottom-up 
innovation capacity. As with previous revolutions, it does so by renewing the salience of the Community 
principle in the organization of various activities, while at the same time introducing a new type of 
community. Earlier revolutions’ balancing models relied on forms of community that were based on 
tradition or affectual ties. This revolution, by contrast, seems to rely on—and stimulate the emergence 
of—a new type of community that is capable of bringing together large networks of very heterogeneous 
groups of people around a sense of “shared purpose” (Adler and Heckscher 2018). The “purpose” of such 
communities can be more localized and mundane—for example, to develop a software utility—or it can 
be more elevated, like responding to a “grand challenge” such as the climate emergency. In either form, 
its day-to-day management relies on collaborative goal setting, contribution-based rewards offering low-
powered financial incentives combined with prominent social incentives, formal systems that enable 
rather than coerce, and distributed leadership (Adler and Heckscher 2018). 
Looking forward to the prospects of the digital transformation, we see two main types of 
responses to the current critical problem in the organizational sphere; each type points to a different 
scenario. In the first type, the Business Process model remains dominant and integrates the Community-
and-Collaboration model only partially, perhaps only at a symbolic and rhetorical level. In the second 
type, the Community-and-Collaboration model becomes dominant and incorporates the advances of the 
paradigm-revolutionizing model while transcending its limitations. 
This fork in the road is particularly visible in the case of platform companies. In many of the 
dominant platforms, we see the first type of scenario: the Business Process model remains dominant, even 
as its dysfunctions have become increasingly visible, and there is little evidence that the Community-and-
Collaboration model is diffusing. The massive network effects of digital technologies generate “winner-
takes-all” competitive dynamics that subordinate Community to Market priorities. Consider Facebook. 
Yes, Facebook created opportunities for users to communicate, and this social media technology could 
support the flourishing of community; but that potential was not fulfilled: Facebook’s deployment of this 
technology is dominated by a Business Process logic (exchanging clicks for advertising dollars), and the 
company jealously guards its ability to repurpose the resulting data regardless of users’ interests or 
preferences (notoriously in the case of Cambridge Analytica). Governance of this network is controlled 
by and for the platform owner (Srinivasan 2019, 2020). Or consider Amazon Marketplace. Here too, the 
actors on both sides of the platform are weak relative to the platform owner. Digital technologies are used 
to control and eliminate labor. Amazon uses data on their suppliers’ sales to design and under-price 
competing products. The Business Process model helps exploit “platform dependency”—the 
asymmetrical power relation between platform users and platform owners (Schor 2020)—and in the 
process, undermines community. 
The second type of scenario could be easily imagined: In the case of platforms such as Facebook, 
the network would not be controlled by the platform owner, but would be operated by and for the 
community of users. In the case of Amazon, data would not be used to enable Amazon’s owners to 
capture more private value, but would help build a community among suppliers that would enable them 
 
3 The Community-and-Collaboration model transcends the more common concept of “community of 
practice”: the latter typically refers to communities that share a common discipline and socialization 
informing their occupational practice. Such a bounded form of community would be less adequate to 
bridge the diverse occupations and perspectives that need to be recombined in the Network paradigm. 
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collectively and collaboratively to improve their offerings. The power relations between platform users 
and owners could be much more symmetrical. 
The choices made at this fork in the road will also have a major impact on the future path of the 
technology sphere. In the first type of scenario, new technologies such as AI, robots, and autonomous 
vehicles might be the basis for a future governed by a small number of companies—like Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon—who rely on the Business Process model to intensify their control and 
surveillance, or by authoritarian governments for the same benefit. Alternatively, if the Community-and-
Collaboration model were to prevail, these technologies could be used to enhance organizational 
transparency and accountability (Albu and Flyverbom 2019) and AI could create and enrich jobs rather 
than destroy and impoverish them (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020). Worker-owned platform cooperatives, 
where members collectively set fares, compensation, and investment, could displace extractive platforms 
(Scholz and Schneider 2017). 
Which path will the digital transformation take? History suggests that this depends in part on 
choices made in the public policy sphere. 
The public policy sphere: between neoliberal laissez-faire and proactive system-building 
As was the case in previous revolutions, the dominant public policy regime in the installation 
phase of the ICT revolution was a laissez-faire type. The enthusiasm for the potential of the new 
technologies conflicted with the inherited public policy regime, and the latter gave way to the current 
instantiation of laissez-faire—“neoliberalism” as it is frequently referred to (Cahill et al. 2018; Harvey 
2007a; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005).4 Bernstein (2006) describes this neoliberal form as a YOYO 
regime: “you’re on your own.” Enthusiasm among investors for the new technologies’ potential led to a 
stock-market frenzy, which government encouraged by scaling back financial regulations: the Clinton 
administration abrogated the long-standing Glass-Steagall Act and refused to regulate the expanding 
market for derivatives. The network effects so common among the new core technologies might have led 
to antitrust action, but in the enthusiasm of the installation period, antitrust enforcement was scaled back 
rather than intensified—yielding platform oligopolies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and 
Microsoft. Similarly, the outsourcing encouraged by the Business Process model prompted the 
proliferation of independent contractors and, in the face of this development, labor regulations were 
ignored when they would have barred the misclassification of so many employees. Online retailers like 
Amazon were allowed to sell into states without collecting the corresponding sales tax. Many of the 
leading platform companies relied on business models in which users were offered free access while data 
about them were captured and sold to advertisers, yet privacy regulations were remarkably absent. 
(Europe imposed somewhat stricter privacy rules with the General Data Protection Regulation.) 
The neoliberal laissez-faire regime thus encouraged installation; but, as we move toward 
deployment, a new critical problem has emerged in the misfit between the technology and public policy 
spheres. Moves toward neoliberalism have led to extreme income inequality, stagnant real wages for 
most, and exacerbated employment insecurity, which all limit the mass market for new digitally enhanced 
consumer goods. The emergence of giant oligopolies has raised urgent questions about market power and 
political influence. Moreover, the exciting possibilities of digital technologies—helping us address critical 
issues in sustainability, education, healthcare, and advance opportunities like autonomous automobiles—
are held back by doubts among firms and investors as to which direction deployment will take and how 
fast it will unfold. Deployment is further handicapped by lack of investment in the requisite social and 
material infrastructure. In prior revolutions, massive system-building investments in canals, railways, 
 
4 “Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be 
advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework 
characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” 
(Harvey 2007b, p. 22). 
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electric grids, and highway systems were key enablers of deployment. While in some countries 
government has played a bigger role than in the United States in telecommunications infrastructure 
(resulting, for example, in wider use of broadband at lower cost), neither in Europe nor the United States 
has government adopted a policy regime that promises to address the material and social infrastructure 
required to unleash the full potential of the digital transformation. 
Faced with this critical problem in the public policy sphere, we are today at a fork in the road. 
One option is to go yet further in a laissez-faire direction: the system-building efforts necessary for 
deployment could be led by private firms. If a laissez-faire regime went further in dismantling antitrust 
regulation and in further weakening labor laws protecting employees and unions, perhaps platform 
oligopolies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft could create the necessary systems, 
not as tax-funded public goods and services but as investor-financed private ones (Rikap and Lundvall 
2020). Proponents of the neoliberal laissez-faire view highlight the advantages of retaining initiative in 
the hands of private firms and point to the dangers of “government failure” (Winston 2006). It is much 
less clear, however, how this option, which seems destined to further aggravate income inequality and 
economic precariousness, would sustain effective demand for these new digital goods and services. And 
the political costs of leaving so many people “behind” are high: it prompts the emergence of nationalist 
populist movements, which in turn creates havoc in the political sphere. 
The alternative to a neoliberal laissez-faire regime in the current technology revolution is still 
taking shape, but some powerful concepts are emerging (Schot and Steinmueller 2018). Mazzucato 
(2021) synthesizes several of these concepts in her description of a new form of system-building regime 
(which we call “proactive”), where government proactively creates public value by taking the lead in 
system-building “missions”—integrated programs that create knowledge and infrastructure in the public 
interest, and that guide private industry and investment in a more sustainable direction. (On public value, 
also see O'Flynn (2007).) Mazzucato argues that reliance on private-value creation by industry, as 
expressed in the neoliberal laissez-faire regime, might lead to some important technological innovations 
such as autonomous vehicles, wearable devices, or cheaper solar panels, but will not enable us to deploy 
the ICT revolution across the wider spectrum of applications in education, healthcare, mobility, or energy 
systems. The creation of a comprehensive smart-energy system, for example, requires the involvement of 
various sectors such as electricity, heating, buildings, and transportation (Lund et al. 2017), and it is 
difficult to imagine that we can get the necessary coordination and investment for such a transformation 
without a shift toward a system-building public policy regime. 
This brings us to our third summary proposition: In the face of the current critical public policy 
problem, the choice is whether to strengthen further neoliberal laissez-faire or to move toward a 
proactive system-building regime. The choice between these two options will enable and constrain 
choices in the organizational sphere, and in combination, these two choices will condition the future 
trajectory of the digital transformation. The contrast between these options is presented in Table 3. 
<Put Table 3 about here> 
Laissez-faire and system-building regimes are characterized by a dialectical tension similar to the 
one we observed in the organization sphere. Arguments in favor of a proactive system-building regime 
are triggered by the dysfunctions of neoliberalism in the face of the potentialities of the ICT revolution. 
The extended period of crisis that separates installation and deployment, which began with the dot.com 
crash and continues unresolved, has “unfrozen” debate over which path is more promising. The 
installation phase under neoliberal auspices has brought considerable destruction in its wake—the 
destructive part of Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”—and a proactive system-building regime looks 
increasingly attractive as a way to get to the creative part. The counterargument is that system-building 
efforts could better be led by the private sector. 
The collective choice we make in the public policy sphere also has an impact on the organization 
sphere. To illustrate this impact, consider ride hailing. On the one hand, Uber is a prototypical 
“extractive” platform based on the Business Process model. Uber’s growth in the United States, facilitated 
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by laissez-faire, has led to some benefits for passengers (cost, convenience) and drivers (access to part-
time employment) but also to considerable negative externalities (lower pay levels, reduced support for 
public transportation, city congestion). Uber stands as emblematic of the installation phase frenzy, funded 
not by a sustainable business case, but by the frenzy of investors convinced there is a pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow (Horan 2019). 
On the other hand, cooperatives such as the Green Taxi Cooperative in Denver (Colorado) and 
the ATX taxi cooperative in Austin (Texas) (Borowiak and Ji 2019; Schneider 2016; Scholz 2017) offer 
an alternative closer to the Community-and-Collaboration model. But it is hard to see how such a 
management model can generalize across the economy without a turn away from neoliberal laissez-faire, 
through renewed antitrust enforcement and stronger regulations ensuring workers are not inappropriately 
treated as independent contractors. So long as Uber can treat drivers as independent contractors, so long 
as laws limit the collective action options available to such independent contractors, and so long as Uber 
can employ predatory pricing to drive out competitors, Uber will be able to pay drivers much less than 
any cooperative and keep their dominant market position. Is there a scenario in which public policy could 
support the development of a superior community-oriented alternative, such as a public transportation 
system that embodies the flexibility and convenience of Uber? We turn to such options in the section 
below. 
SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
It follows from the preceding sections that different societies, characterized by different responses 
to the critical problems that have emerged in the organizational and public policy spheres, will deploy 
differently the emerging technologies of the digital transformation. Our analysis in the previous sections 
suggests the basic choices available in each of the two spheres: 
(1) In the organization sphere, deployment can be guided by a Market- and Hierarchy-based 
Business Process model, or alternatively by a Community-based paradigm-balancing model 
(Community-and-Collaboration)—either dominating networks to capture value or 
empowering community to create value. 
(2) In the public policy sphere, deployment can be guided by a neoliberal laissez-faire regime 
based on faith in self-organizing markets and the primacy of private-value creation, or 
alternatively by a proactive system-building regime where government advances missions 
aimed at creating public value. 
Combining the two key choices, we can identify four scenarios for the future trajectory of the ICT 
revolution and the digital transformation: development can proceed toward digital oligarchy, digital 
authoritarianism, digital localism, or digital democracy. (On the value of scenarios in management and 
organization research, see Hoffman and Jennings (2021) and Farjoun (2008).) These four scenarios 
represent “corner solutions” (as shown in Figure 1), and most real-world cases will be situated between 
these extremes. Below we outline the four scenarios, and then discuss their heuristic value.  
<Put Figure 1 about here> 
Digital oligarchy 
Oligarchy means rule by the few, but we follow Aristotle and use it to refer to rule by the wealthy 
few (Miller 2017). Digital oligarchy is a scenario that combines a neoliberal laissez-faire regime with a 
Business Process management model. Government plays little active role in stimulating technology 
development or deployment, leaving it to market forces—and to digital oligopolies as they emerge 
through market competition—to set the direction of the digital transformation. 
The United States has moved in this direction since the 1970s. Over this same period, and partly 
encouraged by this shift in regime, the Business Process model diffused across US industry. This 
diffusion was fastest in the new core industries of the ICT revolution. This context, characterized by a 
winner-takes-all logic encouraged by the strong network effects of the ICT revolution, was fertile ground 
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for the rise of oligopolists such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. These firms’ 
market and political power enabled them to buy innovative technology start-ups (e.g., Amazon acquired 
Zoox; Apple, Siri; Facebook, Instagram; Google, DeepMind; and Microsoft, Skype) and to integrate them 
into their ever more powerful platform empires (Radziwill 2018; Umeh 2016). As a consequence, 
emerging technologies are increasingly shaped by these corporate giants. In this scenario, these giants’ 
property rights preempt national data- and technology-sovereignty. Surveillance—extracting and selling 
data culled from users in ways kept secret from those users—is a key source of profit (Zuboff 2019). 
Even free-speech rights become a matter of private corporate policy rather than public policy, as 
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube decide who and what to censor. 
Digital authoritarianism 
The digital authoritarianism scenario combines a proactive system-building regime with a 
Business Process management model. Here government plays an active role in investing in technology 
development and deployment, and thus creating public value—albeit public value as understood by an 
unaccountable governing elite (e.g. Khalil 2020; Polyakova and Meserole 2019). Hierarchy functions as 
the key organizing principle within government as well as between government on the one hand and 
private enterprises and citizens on the other. Community is suppressed—social networks are restricted—
because it might threaten government control. Deployment of digital technologies is steered in a way that 
keeps technology sovereignty in the hands of a powerful state elite and equips that elite with effective 
systems for surveillance and control. Surveillance is legitimized by a low rate of criminality, by 
nationalist appeals, and/or by aggregate economic growth. Authoritarian rule has performed rather well in 
accelerating economic growth in “developing” economies—witness China (Yang 2006) and Singapore 
(Verweij and Pelizzo 2009). 
Digital localism 
Digital localism combines a laissez-faire public policy regime at the national level with a variety 
of management models at the local level, yielding a patchwork pattern where the Community-and-
Collaboration model prevails in some jurisdictions and Business Process in others. With a laissez-faire 
public policy, central government plays little role in shaping the direction of deployment.  
We might expect this to lead generally to digital oligarchy; however, in some local contexts, 
alliances of actors might push successfully for the resolution of urgent local problems, shaping the 
decisions of local jurisdictions. Local jurisdictions might opt for policies more supportive of the 
Community-and-Collaboration alternative, and they might be powerful enough to block the entry of giant 
corporations and to mobilize citizens and local businesses toward community wealth-building. (Dubb 
2016; Hess and Gottlieb 2009). Deployment of digital technologies can be organized here to ensure a 
certain level of technology sovereignty for the local community, as in Barcelona for example (Eizaguirre 
et al. 2017). While change at the local level may be easier, the digital localism scenario foregoes the 
potential benefits of scale and interconnectivity at the national level. 
Digital democracy 
A digital democracy scenario combines a proactive system-building regime with a Community-
and-Collaboration management model. In contrast to digital oligarchy, government here not only 
encourages private-sector initiative and responds energetically to the resulting negative social and 
environment externalities, but also shapes the direction of technology development and deployment in a 
purposeful way. In contrast to digital localism, deployment activates all levels of government and society, 
harnessing network effects and other positive externalities on a national level. In contrast to digital 
authoritarianism, here deployment is steered in a way that strengthens collaboration, enriches and 
activates community, by widening and deepening democratic participation. The formal systems of 
government in this scenario play an enabling rather than coercive role, fostering rather than suppressing 
community initiative. Whereas an authoritarian regime is fearful of the political risks of community, a 
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democratic one would activate community in neighborhoods and organizations and in relations between 
the public and government. Technology sovereignty would be in the hands of citizens. 
Notwithstanding the fact that no major country has so far embraced a digital democracy scenario, 
macro-Schumpeterians like Perez (2009) and Mazzucato (2018) argue that this is the most likely path to 
deployment success, given the historical record of previous revolutions, where deployment was 
stimulated by the combination of a system-building policy regime and a paradigm-balancing management 
model. The other three scenarios seem less likely to tap the digital transformation’s full potential. 
The heuristic value of the scenarios 
Since most real-world cases will be situated between the extremes represented by these four 
scenarios (as presented in Figure 1), let us now show the heuristic value of this scenario matrix as a map 
for analyzing concrete cases. 
First, Figure 1 could be used to locate different countries or supranational unions and trace their 
zig-zag trajectories. A comprehensive analysis of any specific country would require a paper of it its own, 
but some observations might be useful.5 The United States has been the global leader in the installation 
phase of the ICT revolution: the combination of a dominant Business Process model and a neoliberal 
laissez-faire regime has strengthened the position of the giant US-based platform firms. It is not clear, 
however, that this digital oligarchy scenario will allow the United States to retain leadership as we move 
into deployment, given the retreat of both the federal government and the private sector from R&D 
investment and the escalating inequalities in income and wealth (Soskice 2020). We should note that the 
United States is not a pure case of laissez-faire: the defense and security domains, for example, seem to 
operate under a more system-building public policy regime and are largely exempt from budget cuts. 
China too has relied mainly on the Business Process model but has married that with a system-
building policy regime. Government control over the economy has become considerably more selective 
since the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, offering a more laissez-faire regime in important 
sectors of the economy; this has yielded giant digital oligopolies of its own (e.g., Tencent and Alibaba) 
operating under the umbrella of digital authoritarianism (Lundvall and Rikap 2022). It remains to be seen 
whether that mix is stable or whether the growing power of private enterprise will threaten the control of 
the Communist Party (Csanadi 2016). 
The European Union seems to be aiming for middle-way solutions somewhere between digital 
oligarchy and localism. But such a middle way has encountered roadblocks, generating neither globally 
competitive tech firms nor dominant public platform alternatives. And in the interim, smaller innovative 
tech firms in Europe are assimilated into the US tech platform empires, such as in the case of Google’s 
acquisition of British DeepMind (Rikap and Lundvall 2020). Efforts to find a middle way might risk 
getting “stuck in the middle.” 
Zooming in from the country level to smaller units of analysis, we can also use this map to 
explore empirically the effects of alternative management models and public policy regimes on specific 
sectors and regions that may operate under different models and regimes, as noted above for the US 
civilian versus defense sectors, or as noted by Kattel and Mergel (2019) for Estonia’s ICT sector versus 
other sectors.  
We could also use the four scenarios as a heuristic to inform meso-level research (reviewed by 
Ahuja et al. 2008), to understand, for example, the political strategies of organizations. The tech giants 
have actively lobbied for a laissez-faire regime in the United States and in Europe (Brannon 2019; 
Corporate Europe Observatory 2020). Given that China is the only country where major competitors to 
these giants have emerged, it would seem that their strategies have been largely successful. What then are 
 
5 During technological revolutions, the trajectories of “leading countries” and countries that are “catching 
up” differ. For a comparative analysis of the evolution of management models in some countries that 
were catching up during the prior two technological revolutions, see Guillen (1994). 
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the prospects for platform cooperatives? Taxi cooperatives have encountered enormous difficulties when 
trying to “share the road” with Uber (Borowiak and Ji 2019; Schneider 2016; Scholz 2017). As noted 
earlier, under the prevailing neoliberal laissez-faire regime, Uber undermines the cooperatives’ 
competitive viability by offering customers unbeatable prices. Our scenario matrix suggests that where 
interests diverge so fundamentally, the most effective strategic choice for taxi cooperatives might be to 
seek out arrangements with local governments to pursue a digital localism scenario, with rules of the 
game that favor small cooperatives. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to develop a conceptual framework for understanding and bounding the 
uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the digital transformation. To that end, we expanded 
Schumpeter’s theory of technological revolutions and the macro-Schumpeterian account of prior 
revolutions, and we explored how the trajectory of those revolutions was shaped by the emergence of 
critical problems and competing solutions in the triple system of technology, organization, and public 
policy. Given the advanced state of technology today, the future of the digital transformation hinges on 
choices to be made between the competing solutions in the organization and public policy spheres: in the 
former, the choice appears to be between the currently dominant Business Process model or an emerging 
Community-and-Collaboration model, and in the latter, between the currently dominant neoliberal 
laissez-faire regime or an emerging proactive system-building alternative. The conjunction of these two 
choices suggested four scenarios for the future trajectory of the digital transformation: digital oligarchy, 
digital authoritarianism, digital localism, and digital democracy. Given the uncertain evolution of 
management models and the public policy regimes, it is easy to understand the current deep uncertainty 
about the future trajectory of the digital transformation. In the United States, Zuboff (2019) argues that we 
are headed toward “surveillance capitalism” and a digital oligarchy scenario. But debate—and political 
struggle—continue in both public policy and organizational spheres: the die is not cast. 
We hope that the framework we have advanced here and the conclusion to which it leads us will 
encourage future research on the forces shaping the choices we face. This paper focuses on the nature of 
those choices, but we need to understand who is doing the choosing and how. Future research should aim 
to identify the specific actors involved in the digital transformation and how their power and interactions 
both shape and are shaped by choices in management models and public policy. We should explore the 
competition and cooperation between the various groups and individuals involved—competing firms and 
sectors, innovative practitioners, academic theorists, gurus popular in the media, consultancy firms, 
institutional entrepreneurs in government agencies, unions, and social movements. They all played roles 
in previous revolutions (Bodrožić 2008), and will surely play important roles in this one. What networks 
do these actors form and how do these networks shape the course of this technological revolution? Which 
actors promote and which resist the broadening of government’s role and the transformation of 
management models? How do these struggles unfold over time? What are the mechanisms underlying this 
persistence of inherited management models and policy regimes? Political-economy theory, social 
movement theory, and neo-institutionalist theory might provide powerful conceptual tools for this kind of 
analysis. 
Whether the digital transformation serves the needs of the people and the planet, or, alternatively, 
serves to reinforce structures of inequality and domination will depend on the choices and actions of 
citizens, innovators, movement activists, and policy makers. We can choose to create and implement 
digital tools, management practices, and public policies to support surveillance of activists, to enable 
corporate censorship, or to empower local communities, or even to reinvigorate democracy. Management 
and organization scholars have a role to play in informing these choices. 
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Table 1: A timeline of the ICT revolution6 
 
Critical 
problems in the 
evolution of the 
digital 
paradigm  





1960s Incubation of computer 
components 
1968: Intel 










1987: McAfee, Huawei 
1990s Emergence of networked 
computers and internet  
1993: Nvidia 
1994: Amazon, Yahoo 
1996: eBay 
1998: Google, PayPal, Tencent 




that facilitate a 
wider variety of 
applications 
2000s Emergence of mobile, 






2006: Twitter, Spotify 
2008: Airbnb 
2009: Uber, WhatsApp, Pinterest, 
Bitcoin 
2010s Emergence of AI, big data, 
Internet of Things, 
blockchain 
2010: Instagram, DeepMind 
2011: Banjo, Snapchat 
2012: ThoughtSpot 
2013: Databricks 
2014: SenseTime, Zoox 
2015: Ethereum 
2015: CloudMinds, OpenAI 




6 We thank Stan Karanasios for his help in compiling this timeline. 
                                                          Alternative futures for the digital transformation  
 
   p. 29 
29 
Table 2: Two management models for the digital transformation 
 







Business Process model: 
Rationalizing internal and external processes, 
enabling exploitation and value capture 
Community-and-Collaboration model: 
Recreating social fabric, enabling 





Obsoleting the inherited organizational 
paradigm and establishing the new 
organizational paradigm 
Rebalancing the new organizational paradigm 
Harnessing the new possibilities generated by 
the new technology cluster 
Harnessing the bottom-up innovation capacity 
of people and organizations 
Re-establishing external fit by overcoming the 
limitations of the inherited model in this new 
technological context 
Re-establishing internal fit by overcoming the 




Line-and-Staff in steam-power-and-railways 
revolution 
Industrial betterment in steam-power-and-
railways revolution 
Scientific Management in steel-and-electricity 
revolution 
Human Relations in steel-and-electricity 
revolution 
Strategy-and-Structure in automobile-and-oil 
revolution 
Quality Management in automobile-and-oil 
revolution 
Theorizations 
of the contrast 
between 
models 
Rational/technical (Barley and Kunda 1992) Normative/human (Barley and Kunda 1992) 
Environmental fit (Miller 1992) Internal fit (Miller 1992) 
Market and Hierarchy as dominant organizing 
principles (Adler 2001) 
Community as dominant organizing principle 
(Adler 2001) 
Key features 
of the current 
alternatives 
Use technology to eliminate labor Use technology to augment labor capabilities 
Outsource to arm’s-length suppliers Build collaborative interfirm networks 
Build asymmetrical power relations Build shared power 
Pursue market goals: exploitation and value 
capture 








Strategic alliances (Barney and Hansen 1994) Ecosystem (Jacobides et al. 2018) 
Idea searching (Majchrzak and Malhotra 2020) Collaborative crowdsourcing (Majchrzak and 
Malhotra 2020)  
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Table 3: Two public policy regimes for the digital transformation 
 





Government supports primacy of private-
value creation by self-organizing markets 
Proactive public policy: 
Government leads public-value creation 
through system-building missions  




Buttress the autonomy of firms in the 
economic playing field 
Tilt the economic playing field in the 
direction of the desired change 
Enable private-value creation through 
deregulation and privatization 
Lead public-value creation to address “grand 
challenges” and “grand opportunities” 
Keep political influence out of economic 
activity 
Exert political influence to prevent negative 
externalities; subsidize positive externalities; 





Railway mania Comprehensive US railway system  
Steel mania Comprehensive US electricity system 






Private interest (Hirschman 2002) Public interest (Hirschman 2002) 
Dis-embedded economy (Polanyi [1944] 
1968) 
Re-embedded economy (Polanyi [1944] 1968) 
Key features of 
the current 
alternatives 
Private innovation systems that advance 
the deployment of AI and other 
technologies  
Public innovation systems that advance the 
deployment of AI and other technologies 
Technological sovereignty in the hands of 
private firms 
Technological sovereignty in the hands of 
public institutions 
Government and courts strengthen property 
rights of technology firms with respect to 
data and knowledge 
Government and courts strengthen public and 








Minimal state (Nozick 1974)  Entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2015) 
Free-market economy (Friedman 1970) Smart, green growth (Perez 2019) 
New public management (Barzelay 2001) Mission economy (Mazzucato 2021) 
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Figure 1: Four scenarios for the digital transformation 
 
 
 
 
